Geopolitical Mining · Central Report
Shield of the Americas: How the Hemispheric Framework Took Shape
From U.S. strategic doctrine to security cooperation, economic sovereignty and critical minerals
Shield of the Americas has developed through several policy tracks that moved at different speeds during 2026. Its security component grew out of a regional counter cartel initiative. Its political scope widened through the first Shield summit and subsequent joint statements. By September, fifteen governments had defined three common pillars, Economic, Security and Multilateral Coordination, and had placed investment screening, critical mineral supply chains and trusted digital suppliers within the collective agenda.[5][12]
The sequence begins before the Shield itself. The Trump administration had already identified the Western Hemisphere, strategic resources, critical supply chains and regional economic relationships as national security priorities. At the same time, the Department of War was rebuilding the defense industrial base and moving capital into critical material supply chains. The hemispheric initiatives that followed in March therefore developed inside a broader U.S. strategic reorientation whose economic and security dimensions were already closely connected.[1][2][3]
This report provides the central reference for Geopolitical Mining’s coverage of the Shield of the Americas. It reconstructs how the initiative took shape, identifies the decisions that expanded its scope, and separates the shared commitments of participating governments from policies pursued independently by Washington. Country reports will examine how individual governments translate those commitments into security, investment, industrial and mining decisions as the initiative continues to develop. Country reports will be released progressively as the initiative develops. To receive each report, subscribe to the Geopolitical Mining Briefing.
This report applies the systemic perspective developed in Mining Is Dead. Long Live Geopolitical Mining: mineral strategy is shaped by the interaction of security, capital, institutions, industrial capacity and the wider productive system.
At a glance
Key Takeaways
- The U.S. strategic shift preceded the Shield. The 2025 National Security Strategy already linked the Western Hemisphere with critical supply chains, strategic resources, infrastructure and stronger regional partnerships.
- The Americas Counter Cartel Conference created the first formal security track in March 2026, before the first Shield summit and with a different participant group.
- President Trump presented the Shield on March 7 as a broader hemispheric organization built around security, prosperity, free commerce and the rule of law, with Marco Rubio leading much of the diplomatic organization and Pete Hegseth driving the defense track.
- During the summer, the security coalition became more operational through SOUTHCOM while the Department of War separately expanded direct intervention in critical mineral supply chains.
- On September 22, fifteen governments formally defined Economic, Security and Multilateral Coordination pillars. Critical minerals and investment screening entered the Shield’s collective language at that point.
Before the Shield: Washington redefines its hemispheric priorities
The 2025 National Security Strategy provides the clearest strategic starting point. The Trump administration places the Western Hemisphere among the United States’ core security interests and connects regional stability with criminal networks, strategic assets and critical supply chains. The document calls for closer security cooperation, stronger regional supply chains and a wider network of partners able to work with the United States across economic and security priorities.[1]
Its Western Hemisphere section is explicit about strategic resources. The National Security Council is tasked with identifying strategic points and resources in the region for protection and joint development with partners. The strategy also directs U.S. agencies to identify investment opportunities, mobilize government financing programmes, strengthen energy and communications infrastructure and invest in critical mineral access. This establishes the policy setting in which later hemispheric initiatives would develop.[1]
The document also introduces the idea of expanding the U.S. partnership network across the region. It explicitly seeks to restore U.S. preeminence in the Western Hemisphere and states that the terms of alliances and assistance should be linked to reducing adversarial outside influence over military installations, ports, key infrastructure and strategic assets. These are U.S. objectives. The agreements reached later through the Shield determine which parts of that agenda participating governments choose to share.[1]
January 2026: defense policy turns toward industrial capacity
The 2026 National Defense Strategy, issued under Secretary of War Pete Hegseth, develops the industrial dimension of U.S. defense policy. Its priorities include defending the homeland and U.S. interests in the Western Hemisphere, increasing allied burden sharing and strengthening the defense industrial base. The strategy treats industrial capacity as part of military readiness: equipment, munitions, logistics and the productive system needed to replenish them all become elements of defense capability.[2]
Critical minerals become visible through execution. On March 4, the Department of War announced a US$27 million investment in domestic antimony extraction, processing and refining. The department connected the investment to supply chain resilience and defense requirements, illustrating how mineral security was already being translated into industrial policy before the first Shield summit.[3]
By early March, the U.S. policy setting therefore had two established features: the Western Hemisphere had been elevated within national security strategy, and the defense establishment was investing directly in material supply chains. The counter cartel and Shield initiatives began while both lines were already moving forward.
March 4–5: the Americas Counter Cartel Conference creates the security track
Secretary Hegseth hosted the inaugural Americas Counter Cartel Conference at U.S. Southern Command headquarters in Doral, Florida. Defense and security leaders from seventeen countries signed a joint security declaration centred on peace, sovereignty and stability across the hemisphere. The document calls for expanded bilateral and multilateral cooperation, stronger border security, action against narcoterrorism and trafficking, protection of critical infrastructure and a coalition to address shared threats.[4]
The signatories were the United States, Argentina, the Bahamas, Belize, Bolivia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Jamaica, Panama, Paraguay, Peru and Trinidad and Tobago. The declaration also places cooperation within the participating countries’ sovereignty, existing agreements and domestic legal frameworks.[4]
This became the Americas Counter Cartel Coalition. Its starting point was operational security. The composition of the group is important because it did not initially match the political grouping that President Trump would assemble two days later for the first Shield summit.
March 7: Shield of the Americas broadens the framework
President Donald Trump hosted the first Shield of the Americas Summit in Doral on March 7. The official presidential record distinguishes the counter cartel coalition from the broader political initiative. Trump described the coalition as a new military partnership and then said that the countries in the room were also forming the Shield of the Americas around shared priorities of security, prosperity, free commerce and the rule of law.[5]
The leaders identified in the official transcript were President Javier Milei of Argentina, President Rodrigo Paz of Bolivia, President Rodrigo Chaves of Costa Rica, President Luis Abinader of the Dominican Republic, President Daniel Noboa of Ecuador, President Nayib Bukele of El Salvador, President Irfaan Ali of Guyana, President Nasry Asfura of Honduras, President José Raúl Mulino of Panama, President Santiago Peña of Paraguay and Prime Minister Kamla Persad-Bissessar of Trinidad and Tobago. Costa Rica’s president-elect, Laura Fernández Delgado, also attended. Chile was represented by José Antonio Kast, who had been elected president but had not yet taken office.[5]
Kast’s institutional position changed during the period covered by this report. In March, the U.S. presidential record identifies him as Chile’s president-elect. By April, an official U.S. Air Forces Southern record identifies him as President of the Republic of Chile. When Chile appeared among the fifteen governments issuing the September Shield statement, participation was therefore under Kast’s government with him serving as president. Peru, despite having joined the security declaration two days before the March summit, had not been part of the political group identified by Trump in Doral. These differences help explain why later official documents contain different participant counts for the security coalition and the Shield.[5][16]
The administration assembled a broad group of senior officials around the summit. Trump credited Secretary of State Marco Rubio with leading much of the organization and was joined by Secretary Hegseth, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick, Energy Secretary Chris Wright, Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem and U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer. The political composition matched the wider scope Trump assigned to the initiative: security, diplomacy, commerce, energy and economic policy were all represented at the table.[5][7]
The White House also records a Signing Ceremony of the Doral Charter of Liberty during the summit. The official photographic record confirms the ceremony. A complete public text of the Charter has not been located in the official repositories reviewed for this report, so this report does not attribute specific obligations to that document.[6]
Chronology
How the framework developed in 2026
The security coalition, the political Shield and U.S. critical mineral policy developed on related but distinct tracks before becoming more visibly connected in September.
| Date | Hemispheric development | Material and strategic context |
|---|---|---|
| 2025 | U.S. National Security Strategy elevates the Western Hemisphere within national security planning. | Critical supply chains, strategic resources, infrastructure and critical mineral access are incorporated into the U.S. regional strategy.[1] |
| Jan. 2026 | National Defense Strategy reinforces homeland and Western Hemisphere priorities. | Defense industrial capacity becomes a central line of effort.[2] |
| Mar. 4 | No separate hemispheric development | Department of War announces a US$27 million antimony investment tied to defense supply chain resilience.[3] |
| Mar. 4–5 | Seventeen countries sign the Americas Counter Cartel Conference Joint Security Declaration. | Security cooperation focuses on borders, narcoterrorism, trafficking and critical infrastructure.[4] |
| Mar. 7 | First Shield of the Americas Summit; Trump presents the Shield as a broader political organization. | Security, prosperity, free commerce and the rule of law are identified as shared priorities.[5] |
| Jul.–Aug. | Shield diplomacy continues while the counter cartel coalition develops operational capacity. | Department of War expands direct intervention in critical mineral supply chains; SOUTHCOM activates JTF-WHEM.[8][9][11] |
| Sept. 22 | Fifteen governments define Economic, Security and Multilateral Coordination pillars. | Investment screening and critical mineral supply chains enter the Shield’s collective language.[12][13] |
Spring and summer: political coordination and security capacity develop in parallel
During the following months, the Shield began to operate as a vehicle for collective political statements. U.S. official publications recorded joint statements by Shield members on country specific developments, showing that the group was functioning between summits as a diplomatic coordination mechanism. One such statement, published on July 10 through the U.S. Embassy in Chile, addressed Colombia’s institutional transition.[8]
The security track advanced more quickly at the operational level. On August 4, U.S. Southern Command activated Joint Task Force Western Hemisphere, a headquarters designed to synchronize U.S. military operations with allies and partners, integrate intelligence and planning, support maritime interdiction and strengthen rapid response capacity. The announcement referred to eighteen partner nations of the Americas Counter Cartel Coalition.[9]
Later that month, the Department of War reported that the counter cartel coalition had expanded further, with Colombia joining the security grouping. The evolving participation confirms that the security coalition and the political Shield were growing through different channels and on different timetables.[10]
At the same time, U.S. mineral security policy expands across the hemisphere
The Department of War continued expanding its direct role in critical mineral supply chains. On August 24, it announced a US$750 million investment within a US$1.55 billion structure supporting an offtake agreement for mixed rare earth carbonates produced at Serra Verde’s Pela Ema project in Brazil. The department presented the initiative as a measure to secure rare earth supply for national defense and economic security.[11]
Serra Verde was a Department of War mineral security transaction rather than a Shield instrument. Its relevance to the chronology lies in the policy environment it reveals. By August, Washington was already using capital and purchasing arrangements to secure mineral supply from within the Western Hemisphere while hemispheric security cooperation was becoming more operational. One month later, critical minerals would enter the Shield’s own collective economic language.
September 22: the Shield defines three pillars
The most consequential development to date came on September 22. Fifteen governments issued the Joint Statement on Defending Hemispheric Sovereignty through the U.S. Department of State: the United States, Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guyana, Honduras, Panama, Paraguay, Peru and Trinidad and Tobago. Compared with the political group identified at the March summit, Colombia and Peru were now included. In his remarks at the meeting, Rubio said that two members had joined since the previous gathering.[12][13]
For the first time, the participating governments formally organized the Shield around three pillars: Economic, Security and Multilateral Coordination. The economic pillar calls for enhanced cooperation, exploration of investment screening mechanisms, diversified and reliable sourcing for critical mineral supply chains and trusted supplier regulations for digital infrastructure, applied on a non discriminatory basis. It also links economic sovereignty with incoming capital that is transparent and verifiable.[12]
The statement also connects durable security with economic development, stable employment and tangible opportunities for citizens. It sets out that objective without defining a common industrial programme or a single mechanism for delivering those outcomes. The next stage will depend on the laws, agreements, financing tools and implementation choices adopted by participating governments.[12]
The security pillar brings together sanctions, designations, financial actions, expansion of civilian law enforcement, intelligence sharing, access to security technologies and professional training. The multilateral pillar extends coordination into regional and international forums. Rubio described the Shield as an opportunity to act jointly on economic and diplomatic issues and, where interests align, to coordinate positions and potentially votes in international institutions.[12][13]
The first joint action announced and the Rio Treaty route
The September declaration identifies the first joint action under the three pillars. Participating governments list 24 organizations that they intend to confront collectively, including Tren de Aragua, MS-13, FARC dissident groups, ELN, Clan del Golfo, Los Choneros and Sendero Luminoso. Mexico and Brazil are not among the fifteen governments issuing the statement, while the organizational list includes the Sinaloa Cartel, CJNG, Primeiro Comando da Capital and Comando Vermelho. The measures described include asset freezes, immigration and visa restrictions and criminal liability for knowingly providing material or logistical support. The statement repeatedly makes these measures subject to applicable domestic and international legal obligations.[12]
The governments also announce their intention to request a meeting through the Organization of American States and to consider the establishment of an Organ of Consultation under Articles 6 and 13 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, or Rio Treaty. Once convened, they intend to consider a ministerial resolution facilitating collective action against the identified organizations. The joint statement also addresses Shield participants that are not parties to the Rio Treaty: they support the initiative and intend to contribute in accordance with, and to the extent possible under, their respective international and domestic legal obligations, including participation in the Organ of Consultation where its Rules of Procedure permit.[12][14]
The Rio Treaty gives that route legal significance beyond the political declaration. Its Article 8 lists possible diplomatic, economic and military measures, while Article 20 provides that decisions requiring those measures are binding on ratifying parties, with the exception that no state can be required to use armed force without its consent. The eventual effect will depend on the consultation process, the resolution adopted and the treaty status of the states involved.[14]
What changed by September
The Shield had moved from a broad political formulation into a more defined agenda. Security cooperation was already the most operationally developed component. September added a common economic language around investment screening, capital transparency, trusted digital suppliers and critical mineral supply chains, while also formalizing multilateral coordination as a third pillar. The implementation mechanisms remain uneven and country specific.
What the chronology tells us
The sequence from late 2025 to September 2026 shows how several U.S. priorities became increasingly connected across the hemisphere. National security strategy elevated critical supply chains, strategic resources and regional partnerships. Defense policy placed greater weight on industrial capacity and critical materials. March created a formal regional security coalition and a broader political Shield. During the summer, security cooperation developed operational machinery while the Shield began to function diplomatically. September then placed capital, minerals and technology inside the initiative’s collective economic pillar.[1][4][5][12]
The geopolitical implication is the emergence of a forum through which participating governments can coordinate across security, diplomacy and selected economic interests. Washington’s own strategic objectives remain broader than the collective commitments recorded in the Shield documents. The distinction will matter as the initiative develops: U.S. policy establishes what the Trump administration wants to achieve, while joint statements establish what participating governments have agreed to pursue together.[1][12]
The economic implication is already concrete at the level of agenda setting. The origin and transparency of capital, the possible use of investment screening and the reliability of strategic suppliers have entered a hemispheric discussion about sovereignty. The September declaration leaves the design of those mechanisms open. Participating governments will need to decide whether to establish investment screening mechanisms and, if so, their scope and interaction with existing commercial relationships.[12]
The social dimension is also explicit in the joint statement. Participating governments connect security with economic development, stable jobs and tangible opportunities. The practical test will come through implementation: the volume and quality of investment, the capacity created, the resilience of legitimate economic activity and the distribution of benefits across the countries and communities involved.[12]
Why critical minerals require particular attention
Critical minerals entered the Shield after they had already become established within U.S. national security and defense industrial policy. By March, the Department of War was funding antimony capacity. By August, it was supporting a rare earth offtake structure tied to Brazilian production. On September 22, participating governments placed diversified and reliable critical mineral sourcing inside the Shield’s economic pillar.[3][11][12]
That collective commitment is significant because mineral security now sits alongside investment screening and strategic suppliers within the same economic agenda. The declaration does not identify individual minerals, mines, processing facilities, buyers or financing structures. Those decisions will determine how the policy reaches the mining sector in practice.
For producing countries, the next questions concern the terms under which new capacity is built: access to capital and technology, treatment of existing commercial partners, location of processing and infrastructure, and the balance between mineral supply security and domestic industrial development. For companies, the impact may emerge through investment review rules, financing eligibility, supplier requirements or long term purchasing arrangements. The answers will differ by jurisdiction because countries entered the Shield from different starting points and with different bilateral relationships.
Illegal mining connects the security agenda with mineral producing territories
A second mining implication comes through transnational criminal economies. In December 2019 testimony before the U.S. Senate, State Department official Richard H. Glenn described how illegally mined gold in South America can generate revenue for transnational criminal organizations and provide a channel for laundering proceeds from narcotics and other illicit activities. The testimony also describes links between illegal extraction, transport routes, gold trading, mining inputs and financial networks, particularly where limited state presence allows criminal groups to operate across several activities.[17]
This connection gives the Shield’s security measures a potential mining consequence. The September statement provides for greater intelligence sharing, financial actions, sanctions and coordination against transnational criminal organizations. Where listed or associated organizations derive income from illegal mining, control mineral trading routes or use gold to move and launder value, those instruments could reach parts of the criminal economy surrounding mineral production.[12][17]
The September declaration does not establish a regional illegal mining programme, and the categories of artisanal, informal, illegal and criminal mining require different treatment under national law. The practical effect will depend on the organizations involved, the measures adopted by individual governments and the extent to which enforcement reaches the commercial and financial networks connecting illegal extraction with formal markets.[17]
For the formal mining sector, the issue reaches beyond law enforcement. Criminal control can weaken state authority in mineral producing territories, divert public revenue, expose workers and communities to violence and environmental damage, and increase risks for legitimate operators. Better financial intelligence, traceability and cross border enforcement could strengthen the conditions under which lawful mining operates if implementation is able to separate criminal networks from legitimate economic activity.[17]
From common framework to country implementation
The Shield remains under development. Official U.S. publications after the September meeting continued to use the group for country specific political and security coordination, including an October 1 joint statement supporting Bolivia’s efforts against corruption and narcotrafficking.[15]
The next stage is therefore implementation. The Rio Treaty process, national investment screening mechanisms, trusted supplier rules, sanctions and financial measures, and new critical mineral agreements will show how far the common agenda develops into operational policy. These decisions will not move uniformly across the participating countries.
The country reports in this series will examine those differences. Argentina, Chile, Peru and Colombia already present different trajectories, making national implementation the next necessary level of analysis.
Geopolitical Mining first examined the relationship between the March security initiatives and mining shortly after the inaugural summit. The September framework now provides a more developed basis for following how security, capital and mineral supply are being connected in policy. The quality of the initiative will ultimately be visible in institutional capacity, investment, infrastructure and productive outcomes rather than in declarations alone.[A]
Resources
Sources checked on October 7, 2026. Official U.S. government and Organization of American States sources establish the chronology and published commitments. The interpretation of how the different policy tracks relate to one another, and of their implications for mining and industrial development, is the authors’ analysis. Where a document records a U.S. policy rather than a joint commitment, the article preserves that distinction.
Official sources
Related Geopolitical Mining analysis
Rivera Muñoz, Marta, and Eduardo Zamanillo. Mining Is Dead. Long Live Geopolitical Mining. QM Books.