Geopolitical Mining · Article

What Kind of Governance Does a Mining Company Need?

Why board level competence must become material, technical and asset specific

Authors: Marta Rivera | Eduardo Zamanillo

May 24, 2026

Introduction

The global economy is rediscovering its material base. In a previous Geopolitical Mining essay, we argued that the return of industrial policy is also the return of production, strategic sectors and state capacity. From a mining perspective, that shift has a specific meaning: when industrialization returns, mining returns with it. Not as a peripheral extractive activity, but as part of the material foundation of industrial capability, energy systems, defense, infrastructure and technological development.

This article takes the next step. If the material economy has returned, then the governance of mining companies must also change. For years, corporate governance has been discussed largely through the language of form: board independence, disclosure, compliance, committees, ESG reporting, reputation, market credibility and shareholder alignment. These elements remain necessary. They create discipline, accountability and trust. But they are not sufficient for an industry whose value depends on turning geological potential into real production. Mining is not governed only through financial statements, policies or corporate reports. It is governed through rock, water, energy, explosives, mine plans, processing plants, tailings, contractors, safety systems, permits, communities, capital discipline and geopolitical exposure.

That is why the central question is no longer only whether a mining company looks well governed. The question is whether it is materially governable. Can its board understand the system that converts a mineral resource into safe, reliable, legitimate and economically viable supply? Can technical risk travel from the mine to the boardroom before it becomes institutional crisis? Can directors ask the right questions when production pressure rises? Can the governance structure distinguish between corporate confidence and operational truth? Demand forecasts matter, but they are not the core argument. Supply is a governed outcome. It depends on whether companies, boards, investors and states can align geology, engineering, safety, water, energy, capital, permits, communities and execution over time.

This is what we call material governance: the board level capacity to understand and oversee the physical, technical, territorial, financial and geopolitical system that allows a mineral resource to become production. In the age of geopolitical mining, the boardroom must be able to understand the mine.

For the full Geopolitical Mining framework behind this article, see our book Mining Is Dead. Long Live Geopolitical Mining.

1. From Material Economy to Material Governance

The return of the material economy changes the governance burden on mining companies. In a financialized economy, corporate value could often be mediated through form: market confidence, investor relations, reputational strength, reporting discipline and access to capital. In mining, those forms still matter. A company without financial discipline, transparency, credible oversight or strong controls will be punished by markets, regulators and communities. But the material economy raises a different test. The question is not only whether a mining company can attract capital. It is whether it can convert capital, permits, technology and mineral endowment into reliable production. That conversion is not automatic. It is governed. It depends on asset quality, technical judgment, operational culture, safety systems, sustaining capital, permitting, territorial legitimacy, logistics and the ability to manage pressure without distorting the underlying system.

This matters because the material economy will not only reward production. It will pressure production. Governments will want more strategic minerals. Investors will want growth. Buyers will want secure supply. States will want fiscal revenue. Communities will want benefits and protections. Companies will want to defend market position and margins. In that environment, production targets can become politically and financially loaded. In mining, production pressure is never neutral. It can sharpen execution. But it can also distort incentives, normalize weak signals, defer maintenance, weaken technical reporting and push safety concerns below commercial urgency. A board in this new cycle cannot ask only how much the company can produce. It must ask under what assumptions, with what controls, at what risk, with what sustaining capital and with what effect on asset integrity, workers and territory.

The G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance define core board responsibilities around strategy, performance, risk oversight, internal controls, sustainability matters, reporting systems and objective judgment. That framework remains essential. But mining boards now need to bring those responsibilities into the physical reality of the mine. Formal governance asks whether the company has the right structures. Material governance asks whether those structures are connected to the truth of the asset.

2. The Mine as a System

To understand why mining governance requires technical competence, we need to begin with the mine itself. A mine is a chain of interdependent decisions. The orebody shapes the mine plan. The mine plan shapes equipment needs, sequencing, dilution, recovery and production targets. The processing plant depends on grade, metallurgy, water, power and maintenance. Safety depends on ground conditions, blasting discipline, ventilation, contractors, supervision and culture. Permitting depends on technical design, communities, regulators and time. Capital allocation affects sustaining investment, asset integrity and future production. Nothing in a mine works in isolation.

This is where systems theory becomes useful. General systems theory, associated with Ludwig von Bertalanffy, helps explain why complex organizations cannot be understood only by separating their parts. They must be understood through the relationships among those parts and through their interaction with the surrounding environment. A mine fits that logic directly. It is a physical, technical, human and territorial system where decisions in one area can create consequences elsewhere. In such a system, weak signals matter. A small deviation in technical reporting can reveal a deeper information problem. A repeated maintenance delay can become an asset integrity issue. A near miss can expose a cultural weakness. A permitting delay can reveal a territorial legitimacy problem. A production target can become a safety risk if incentives, assumptions and operational capacity are misaligned.

This is also where W. Ross Ashby’s law of requisite variety becomes relevant. In simple terms, Ashby’s principle suggests that a system trying to govern complexity needs enough variety in its own responses to deal with the variety of disturbances it faces. Applied to mining governance, the implication is direct: a mining board needs enough variety of knowledge to govern both the internal complexity of the mine and its interaction with the external environment. This is a functional argument about competence.

A mine contains several technical realities at once. Mining engineering, geology, geotechnics, metallurgy, processing, chemistry, hydrogeology, tailings, safety, maintenance, planning, energy, environmental management and contractor coordination all read different dimensions of the same asset. Each discipline identifies different risks, constraints, weak signals and long term implications. The relevant point is not that every one of these disciplines must be formally represented on the board. The point is that the board cannot treat technical expertise as a single category or assume that one technical profile is enough to absorb the full internal variety of the mine. The required competence must be deliberate, proportionate and specific to the asset. An underground copper operation, a lithium brine project, a gold mine, an iron ore system or a uranium asset will each require a different combination of technical understanding at board level. In some cases, geotechnical and underground mining expertise may be central. In others, hydrogeology, processing chemistry, tailings, radiation protection, logistics, permitting or community legitimacy may be more decisive. The board does not need to reproduce the full technical organization of the company, but it must contain, and know when to access, the knowledge necessary to interrogate the material risks that matter most.

This is why a single technical seat can become insufficient if it is expected to represent “the mine” as a whole. The mine is not one technical object. It is a system of interdependent disciplines. A board that wants to govern that system needs enough technical, operational, financial, territorial and strategic variety to ask precise questions about both the short term condition of the operation and the long term integrity of the asset. A board that only understands finance will see financial risk. A board that only understands law will see legal risk. A board that only understands reputation will see reputational risk. Even a board with one isolated technical lens may see only part of the mine. A mining board must be able to see rock, water, energy, metallurgy, safety, contractors, permits, communities, tailings and geopolitics as connected elements of the same system. The mine is a system of internal technical variety and external dependencies. The board must have enough technical and strategic variety to govern both.

3. What Existing Governance Models Explain, and What Mining Requires Now

Existing governance models explain part of the problem. None of them is sufficient for mining in the age of the material economy. That does not make them wrong. It makes them incomplete.

Agency theory, associated with Jensen and Meckling, explains the separation between ownership and control. It focuses on agency costs, managerial incentives and the need to align managers with owners. Mining needs that discipline. Boards must monitor management, challenge capital allocation, protect shareholders and ensure accountability. But mining adds a second asymmetry. The gap between management and the board is not only financial or contractual. It is also technical. A board may receive formal reports, review dashboards and comply with governance procedures while lacking the competence to understand whether the information reflects the real condition of the asset. In mining, agency risk includes material information asymmetry: the distance between those who operate the mine and those expected to govern its risks. The governance challenge is therefore not only whether management is aligned with shareholders. It is whether the board can understand, question and verify the material reality management is describing.

Stakeholder theory expands the field of corporate responsibility by recognizing that companies create value through relationships with shareholders, workers, communities, suppliers, governments, regulators and other affected groups. Donaldson and Preston famously frame stakeholder theory through descriptive, instrumental and normative dimensions. In mining, this is not optional. Workers, contractors, communities, Indigenous groups, regulators, local governments and land users are not abstract stakeholders. They are embedded in the operating system of the mine. They shape whether a project can be permitted, built, operated, expanded and closed. But stakeholder theory must be connected back to the function of the mining firm. A mining company does not exist only to manage relationships. It exists to transform a mineral resource into safe, reliable, legitimate and economically viable production. Stakeholder relationships matter because they shape whether that function can be sustained over time. In mining, legitimacy is not only a social or reputational asset. It is a production condition. A mine with weak territorial legitimacy may still have reserves, capital and technical studies, but its ability to operate becomes fragile. Permits become uncertain, timelines stretch, conflict rises, capital becomes cautious and public trust weakens.

Resource dependence theory, associated with Pfeffer and Salancik, examines how external constraints affect organizations and how organizations manage those constraints. Mining makes this dependency visible. A mine depends on land, water, power, infrastructure, capital, permits, technical talent, contractors, regulators, communities, government coordination and market access. No mining company operates as an isolated corporate entity. But mining also requires internal coupling. A company may secure capital, political support, permits and offtake agreements, and still fail if the orebody is poorly understood, the mine plan is unrealistic, the plant cannot perform, tailings governance is weak, critical controls are not functioning or safety culture has deteriorated under pressure. Mining is externally dependent and internally interdependent. The board must understand both.

Hillman and Dalziel integrate agency theory and resource dependence theory by arguing that boards perform two broad functions: monitoring management and providing resources. Their concept of board capital includes the knowledge, experience, networks and judgment directors bring into the boardroom. This is especially relevant for mining, but the material economy sharpens the question. The issue is no longer whether a board has impressive names, financial experience, political access or general corporate reputation. The issue is whether the board has the right competence for the business it governs. In mining, board capital must include material competence. That competence must be defined against the asset’s real risk profile: its mineral, extraction method, processing route, geography, maturity, technical constraints, social setting and geopolitical exposure. A copper underground operation, a lithium brine project, a gold mine, an iron ore system and a uranium asset do not require the same board level questions. Material competence is therefore not generic mining knowledge. It is the capacity to interrogate the specific system the company is expected to govern.

State owned enterprise (SOE) governance adds another layer. The OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State Owned Enterprises emphasize professionalized ownership, stronger legal and institutional frameworks, and practical implementation guidance for SOE governance. This matters for mining countries because state ownership can serve strategic purposes: resource sovereignty, fiscal contribution, industrial policy, supply security and national development. But ownership does not automatically create capacity. A state owned mining company still needs technical discipline, operational independence, capital discipline, safety culture, transparent information flows and board-level competence. Without those elements, the state may own the resource without governing the system that turns it into supply. The strategic question for states is therefore direct: can the public owner create a governance architecture capable of protecting technical judgment while pursuing national objectives?

Mining also belongs in the wider family of high risk industries. The OECD’s guidance on corporate governance for process safety is aimed at senior leaders in high-hazard industries, including board members, directors and executives. Its framework places risk awareness, information, competence and action under leadership and culture. ICMM’s Critical Control Management framework points in the same direction for mining and metals. It focuses on identifying and prioritizing the few controls essential to preventing material unwanted events. This is fundamental for mining boards. The question is not whether risks are listed. The question is whether the critical controls that prevent severe harm are owned, tested, verified and escalated. Material governance requires that this conversation reaches the boardroom.

Taken together, these governance models offer important tools: agency theory explains control, stakeholder theory explains legitimacy, resource dependence theory explains external constraints, board capital explains competence, SOE governance explains ownership architecture, and process safety explains high consequence risk. But mining in the age of the material economy requires a more specific lens. It requires governance capable of connecting all of these dimensions to the material reality of the asset. That is the role of material governance.

4. Defining Material Governance

Material governance is the board-level capacity to understand and oversee the physical, technical, territorial, financial and geopolitical system that allows a mineral resource to become real production. It should not be understood as a separate governance model or as an alternative to corporate governance. It is the substantive layer that mining adds to corporate governance. It is what allows formal governance structures (boards, committees, risk systems, reporting lines, assurance processes and accountability mechanisms) to connect with the operating reality of the asset. In mining, this distinction matters because the company does not operate only through financial statements or corporate presentations. It intervenes in rock, water, land, energy systems, ecosystems, labor environments and communities. It uses heavy equipment, explosives, chemical processes, tailings facilities, complex infrastructure and large contractor networks. When governance is weak, the consequences are not only commercial. They can involve human lives, environmental damage, loss of territorial legitimacy, regulatory intervention, production disruption and long term destruction of value.

That is why technical competence at board level is part of governance itself. It is not an additional ornament or a specialist preference. It is part of the architecture required to supervise an industry where operational decisions can carry material, human and environmental consequences. A board does not need to operate the mine, but it must be able to understand when technical issues become strategic issues. It must know when a safety signal, a geotechnical concern, a tailings warning, a water constraint, a maintenance backlog or a processing deviation is no longer merely operational, but material to the integrity of the company. Material governance connects formal structures with operating reality. It asks whether the board can see the mine as a system rather than as a collection of reports. It asks whether directors can distinguish between a production challenge and an asset integrity problem, between a local operational deviation and a systemic warning, between a sustainability narrative and site level evidence, between formal compliance and real control.

It begins with information. A board cannot govern what it cannot see, and in mining the most important information is often not the easiest to report. Weak signals, technical deviations, operational pressure and site level evidence must be able to travel upward before they become institutional problems. It also requires technical assurance. The board does not need to replace management, but it must know when independent technical review is necessary, particularly in areas such as geotechnical risk, tailings, reserves, project execution, safety and major production assumptions.

A third dimension is critical control oversight. In high risk operations, the question is not whether risks are listed in a register, but whether the controls that prevent severe harm are defined, owned, tested and escalated.

This is also where responsible mining standards become relevant. ICMM’s Mining Principles, the Global Industry Standard on Tailings Management and the Responsible Mining Index all point, in different ways, to the same governance issue: mining commitments must be connected to site level reality. Policies, principles and reports matter, but they only become meaningful when they are translated into functioning controls, accountable leadership, credible information flows and evidence of implementation at the mine. Material governance takes that logic one step further. It asks whether the board can understand and supervise the material conditions under which those commitments are actually delivered. Material governance also depends on productive legitimacy. Workers, communities, regulators and territories are not external audiences. They are part of the conditions that make production possible.

Finally, material governance must connect the mine to strategic materiality: supply concentration, processing capacity, industrial policy, offtake structures, resource nationalism and geopolitical demand. This is the governance standard the material economy is beginning to require from mining companies.

5. Material Governance Must Be Asset-Specific

Material governance cannot be generic. A board governing an underground copper mine does not need the same risk architecture as a board governing a lithium brine project, a gold operation, an iron ore complex or a uranium asset. The mineral matters. The extraction method matters. The processing route matters. The geography matters. The maturity of the asset matters. The political and social setting matters. The relevant question is not only whether the board has mining experience. The better question is whether the board has the right competence for this mineral, this asset, this method, this territory and this stage of development.

The following examples are not exhaustive. They simply show how different mineral systems demand different governance questions.

The implication is simple: a mining board should not be designed around generic prestige. It should be designed around the material risk profile of the company. This is where material governance becomes practical. It does not ask for a decorative list of board skills. It asks whether the board’s collective competence matches the asset’s real risk architecture. An underground copper company needs a different governance conversation from a lithium brine company. A gold company using cyanide needs a different assurance architecture from an iron ore company exposed to logistics, tailings and heritage risk. A uranium company needs a different board level understanding from a copper developer seeking permits in a politically sensitive region. The board does not need to operate the asset. But it must be competent enough to understand what kind of material system it is governing.

6. Signals Across Ownership Models

The cases that follow differ in ownership, geography, mineral exposure and consequence. They are not presented as a comparison, but as three distinct ways in which mining governance can become disconnected from the material reality it is expected to oversee.

Codelco, Rio Tinto and Vale operate under different ownership models, geographies, minerals and institutional contexts. One is a state owned copper company. The others are private sector global mining companies. The issues involved are also different: safety, technical information and production pressure in one case; cultural heritage and territorial legitimacy in another; tailings governance and catastrophic technical risk in the third. That difference is precisely why they are useful. Together, they show that material governance is not a public versus private question. It is a mining governance question. Codelco illustrates how technical information, safety and production pressure can become governance matters in a state owned mining company. The 2025 El Teniente accident, which killed six workers, placed underground mining risk, contractor exposure, geotechnical complexity, emergency response and production continuity at the centre of the governance discussion. Reuters later reported that an internal audit found “serious breaches of duty” by executives after a previous rock explosion at the same mine, including inconsistencies in reports submitted to Chile’s mining regulator, Sernageomin. Codelco’s board also identified governance weaknesses at El Teniente and more broadly across the company, approving a reorganization that would bring senior executives closer to day to day operations. The later production reporting issue reinforced the same concern from another angle. In May 2026, Codelco said an internal audit had found improper reporting in its 2025 production report, including materials from Chuquicamata and Ministro Hales that required further processing and should not have been reported as finished products. The company said the audit did not require changes to its 2025 financial statements, but it dismissed an executive, took disciplinary action and reported the matter to prosecutors. The governance lesson is not only about one operational event or one reporting correction. It is about whether technical signals, safety concerns and production information can move from the mine to the boardroom with enough clarity, speed and authority.

Rio Tinto’s Juukan Gorge crisis illustrates a different dimension of material governance. This was not primarily a question of production reporting or underground safety. It was a question of territorial legitimacy, cultural heritage, internal decision making and the ability of the company’s governance system to recognize that heritage risk was not peripheral to the asset. Rio Tinto’s own board review stated that the destruction of the Juukan rock shelters followed failures in systems, decision making processes and governance, and that the company had to strengthen board oversight and assurance. The governance lesson from Juukan Gorge is that a mine is not only a geological or financial asset. It is located in a territory with history, law, culture, communities and obligations that can become material to the company’s legitimacy and continuity. A board that treats cultural heritage, Indigenous relations or community trust as external social issues may fail to see how deeply they are connected to the operating system of the mine. In this sense, Juukan Gorge shows that material governance includes territorial intelligence: the ability to understand when a community, heritage or legitimacy issue has become a core governance issue.

Vale’s Brumadinho disaster shows a third dimension: catastrophic technical risk. The 2019 collapse of the tailings storage facility at the Córrego do Feijão mine released 11.7 million cubic meters of mining waste, caused extensive destruction and, according to the Global Tailings Review, had resulted in 259 confirmed deaths and 11 people missing as of August 2020. In governance terms, Brumadinho exposed the board level importance of tailings management, technical assurance, critical controls and high consequence risk. The lesson from Brumadinho is that some technical risks cannot remain buried inside operational systems. Tailings, geotechnical stability, water, safety and critical controls are not only engineering matters. They are governance matters because failure can destroy lives, ecosystems, public trust, regulatory confidence and long term corporate value. A board does not need to design a tailings facility, but it must know whether the company has the right controls, independent assurance, escalation channels and accountability structures to govern that risk.

These are not the same case. That is the point. Codelco points toward safety, technical information, production pressure and state owned governance. Rio Tinto points toward cultural heritage, territorial legitimacy and internal decision processes. Brumadinho points toward tailings, critical controls and catastrophic technical risk. Different ownership models. Different minerals. Different geographies. Different failure modes. But one common lesson: mining governance fails when the boardroom is too distant from the material system it is expected to oversee.

7. The New Mining Boardroom

The mining boardroom of the next decade should be built around material competence. That does not mean turning directors into management. It means designing the board so that the company can be challenged from the right angles. A mining board does not need to operate the mine, but it must know what questions require technical answers, what signals require escalation and what issues can no longer be treated as merely operational.

That distinction is central. The board’s role is not to replace management. Its role is to ensure that management is interrogated with enough precision to prevent the company from mistaking corporate confidence for operational truth. A materially competent board should be able to ask whether the production plan is technically credible; whether grade, dilution, recovery and throughput assumptions are realistic; whether geotechnical risks are being escalated early enough; whether blasting, ventilation, ground control and mine sequencing are being governed with sufficient discipline; whether maintenance backlogs are affecting safety or reliability; whether contractors are integrated into the safety system; whether tailings, water and energy are treated as strategic risks rather than only technical functions; whether critical controls are verified or simply documented; whether near misses and weak signals are escalated or normalized; whether sustaining capital is sufficient to protect the asset; whether incentives encourage production at the expense of transparency, maintenance or safety; whether the company’s external narrative reflects site level reality; and whether the board has access to independent technical assurance when needed.

These questions are not operational interference. They are governance. They are how the board protects the company from confusing corporate confidence with material truth. This requires a different kind of boardroom. Some of its capacity must be technical and operational: geology, mine planning, processing, geotechnical risk, tailings, project execution, maintenance and safety. Some of it must be financial: capital allocation, debt, commodity cycles, project finance, sustaining capital and value creation. But mining also requires territorial and institutional judgment: permitting, communities, Indigenous relations, labor, regulators, environmental systems and closure. Increasingly, it also requires geopolitical and market literacy: critical minerals policy, supply chain concentration, processing capacity, strategic buyers, export controls, resource nationalism and industrial policy.

Governance and assurance competence matter as well. A board needs to understand risk architecture, information flows, incentives, internal controls, independent review, crisis escalation and accountability. Competence alone is not enough if the board does not receive the right information, if weak signals are filtered before they reach the top, or if technical assurance remains disconnected from strategic decision making. These competencies do not need to sit in separate individuals in a mechanical way. But they must exist in the board’s collective capacity and in the governance architecture around it. A mining board must have the knowledge to ask better questions, the information channels to receive truthful answers and the authority to act when the answers reveal material risk.

This is true for state owned and private mining companies. State owned companies operate under political, fiscal and national expectations. They may be expected to maximize production, fund public budgets, support employment, sustain strategic supply and advance industrial policy. These goals can be legitimate. They also require governance strong enough to protect technical judgment and long term asset integrity. Private companies face another version of the same challenge. They operate under shareholder expectations, commodity cycles, ESG scrutiny, permitting constraints, community negotiation, rising capital costs, strategic buyers and geopolitical uncertainty. Their challenge is to show that assets are not only valuable in geological terms, but financeable, buildable, governable and operable.

For both models, governance becomes a strategic production capability. It influences whether mineral resources can become supply. It influences whether capital can trust the project. It influences whether communities can trust the company. It influences whether governments can trust the operator. It influences whether the board can protect long term value when short term pressure rises. The next mining cycle will not be won only by those with the largest resources. It will be won by those with the governance capacity to turn resources into reliable supply.

Governance as Strategic Capacity

The return of the material economy is raising the standard for mining governance. As minerals become central to industrial policy, energy security, defense, infrastructure, artificial intelligence and geopolitical positioning, mining companies are entering a more demanding cycle. The strategic question is no longer defined only by resource ownership, market access or production ambition. It is defined by the capacity to convert mineral endowment into reliable, legitimate and disciplined supply.

That capacity is not automatic. It depends on governance. A mine is one of the most complex productive systems in the modern economy. It brings together geology, engineering, capital, water, energy, safety, processing, tailings, contractors, communities, permits, regulation and geopolitical exposure. Its performance depends on how those elements are understood, coordinated and governed over time.

This is why mining governance now requires a deeper standard of board level competence. Formal structures remain essential, but the decisive issue is whether those structures are connected to the material reality of the asset. A board must be able to understand when a technical signal becomes a strategic issue, when production pressure begins to affect judgment, when operational risk threatens long term value, and when the company’s narrative no longer reflects the reality of the mine.

Material governance gives a name to that requirement. It is the substantive layer that mining adds to corporate governance. It connects the boardroom with the physical, technical, territorial and geopolitical conditions that make production possible. It asks whether the board has the competence, information channels, assurance mechanisms and strategic discipline required to govern a high-consequence material system.

In the age of geopolitical mining, mineral resources are no longer passive assets on a balance sheet. They are strategic systems. Their value depends on the quality of the institutions, companies and boards capable of bringing them into production with discipline, legitimacy and continuity. The next mining cycle will not be shaped only by who controls the largest deposits. It will be shaped by who can govern them. In the material economy, the boardroom must be able to understand the mine.

Resources Used

Geopolitical Mining. The Return of the Material Economy.

International Energy Agency. Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2025.

G20/OECD. Principles of Corporate Governance 2023.

OECD. Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises 2024.

OECD. Corporate Governance for Process Safety: Guidance for Senior Leaders in High Hazard Industries.

ICMM. Mining Principles.

ICMM. Critical Control Management.

ICMM. Health and Safety Critical Control Management: Good Practice Guide.

Global Industry Standard on Tailings Management / Global Tailings Review.

Responsible Mining Foundation. Responsible Mining Index Report 2022.

Van Pampus, Hogenboom, Hoorn & Seijmonsbergen. Uncertainties in the Debate on the Environmental Impact of Lithium Brine Extraction in the Salar de Atacama, Chile.

International Cyanide Management Code.

IAEA. Occupational Radiation Protection in the Uranium Mining and Processing Industry.

Codelco. Codelco adopta medidas tras detectar desviaciones en producción 2025.

Reuters. Copper Miner Codelco Sacks Executives After El Teniente Audit.

Reuters. Chile’s Codelco Fires Executive After Internal Audit into 2025 Production Report.

Rio Tinto. Board Review of Cultural Heritage Management after Juukan Gorge.

Global Tailings Review. Brumadinho / Tailings Failure Context.

Theoretical References

Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure.

Donaldson, T., & Preston, L. E. The Stakeholder Theory of the Corporation: Concepts, Evidence, and Implications.

Pfeffer, J., & Salancik, G. R. The External Control of Organizations: A Resource Dependence Perspective.

Hillman, A. J., & Dalziel, T. Boards of Directors and Firm Performance: Integrating Agency and Resource Dependence Perspectives.

Ludwig von Bertalanffy. General System Theory.

W. Ross Ashby. An Introduction to Cybernetics.