Geopolitical Mining Weekly
Week of 19 – 25 January 2026
Authors: Marta Rivera | Eduardo Zamanillo
Independent weekly note for investors and strategic decision makers in critical minerals and mining.
What this week really tells us
This week, five moves stood out in the critical minerals and mining space:
- Davos 2026 explicitly linked AI, the energy transition and reindustrialization to the material system, placing mining at the centre of the global agenda.
- NOAA modernised and accelerated the U.S. permitting framework for deep-sea mining licenses and commercial recovery permits.
- Bolivia’s new government pledged to honour all existing hydrocarbons and lithium contracts while preparing new hydrocarbons and lithium laws.
- Mali centralised operational control of its gold sector in the presidency, reinforcing a tougher mining code with direct political oversight.
- The Canada Infrastructure Bank signalled a pivot into critical minerals, with capital earmarked for enabling infrastructure and feasibility stage projects.
Taken together, these moves show how fast we are moving into what we call the era of substance. Davos framed the problem clearly: AI, defence, energy and industrial policy all converge on the same bottleneck, hardware and materials. NOAA’s deep sea rule, Bolivia’s legal reset, Mali’s centralisation and Canada’s infrastructure financing are early attempts to translate that high level narrative into concrete instruments, rules and capital.
The pattern is not simply “more state” in mining. It is states re-designing the system: deciding which new frontiers can be opened (deep sea), which contracts must be stabilised (Bolivia), how control over rents and compliance is exercised (Mali), and how infrastructure and risk sharing are organised (Canada). The outstanding question is whether this more active role produces predictable, investable frameworks, or a patchwork where political ambition outpaces institutional capacity and social legitimacy.
In practical terms, this week reinforces a message for boards and investors: geopolitical mining is now about who can align reindustrialization, energy transition, institutional speed and social licence in the real material system, not just who has resources in the ground or attractive project economics on paper.
Signals of the week
Signal 1: Davos 2026, mining enters the era of substance
What happened
At the World Economic Forum Annual Meeting 2026 in Davos, political and business leaders linked three agendas in a way that puts mining at the centre of the conversation: artificial intelligence, the energy transition and reindustrialization. In their special addresses, leaders such as Emmanuel Macron, Ursula von der Leyen and Mark Carney framed Europe and North America’s strategies around industrial policy, energy security and critical raw materials, while warning about a world with fewer rules and more power competition.
Alongside these speeches, Davos hosted a series of sessions and forum pieces on critical minerals, circular supply chains and the hardware crisis behind AI and clean energy, arguing that innovation and resilience now depend on secure access to copper, nickel, lithium, rare earths and other transition metals. Private reflections from energy and policy experts also underlined that energy security discussions in Davos routinely started from reducing dependence on a few dominant suppliers of critical minerals and fuels.
In our own piece, “Davos 2026: Coordinates of the New Geopolitical Era” , Geopolitical Mining read these signals together and argued that Davos 2026 marked a shift from an era of form (dominated by declarations, taxonomies and narratives) to an era of substance, where the test is whether countries can align reindustrialization, energy transition, legitimacy and institutional speed in the material system itself.
Why it matters
For mining, Davos 2026 confirms a structural change: the sector is no longer treated as an upstream appendix. It becomes one of the clearest places where this new phase will either work or fail.
Three ideas stand out:
First, the energy and technological transition is a material transition. The AI and robotics agenda discussed by leaders like Elon Musk requires data centres, hardware and massive power systems; the reindustrialization plans defended by the U.S. and Europe require steel, copper, aluminium, batteries and rare earths; the expansion of middle classes in China, India, Indonesia, Egypt and others demands housing, transport and durable goods. None of this happens without large scale extraction, processing and logistics for minerals and metals. Sustainability can no longer be separated from the geography and governance of extraction and processing.
Second, sustainability moves from the declarative plane to the operational plane. In the age of form, sustainability lived in commitments, labels and ESG reports. In the age of substance, the questions are concrete: how long a project takes to be approved under demanding standards; how risks and benefits are shared between states, companies and communities; which technologies are adopted to reduce footprint, water use and waste; and how just transition criteria and local jobs are integrated into business models. Mining becomes an early test of whether high standards and strategic speed can co-exist on real timelines, not just in speeches.
Third, narrative still matters, but only when anchored in matter. Davos remains a stage for values, rules and stories, from Milei and Carney’s discussions on democracy and markets, to Macron and von der Leyen’s defence of institutions, to Fink and others on trust. But Davos 2026 shows that narratives now have to be backed by visible outcomes: projects that communities can see and feel; infrastructures actually built; value chains that pay wages, taxes and reasonable returns; institutions that deliver change within political time horizons; and ecosystems that remain liveable after projects close. When that does not happen, the gap between discourse and reality becomes a political liability.
Read through this lens, Davos 2026 is an early warning for geopolitical mining: the game is no longer defined only by commodity prices or investment cycles, but by who can align reindustrialization, energy transition, legitimacy and institutional speed without breaking the social contract or planetary limits. From here, the key question becomes which countries and companies can operate in this era of substance, and which remain trapped in an older logic of forms without content.
Implications for capital and strategy
For investors and boards, Davos 2026 should be read as confirmation that mining and critical minerals now sit at the core of macro strategy, not at the margin. AI, defence, energy and industrial policy are converging on the same underlying bottleneck: hardware and materials. That means supply assumptions built only on historical cycles or purely financial signals are incomplete; the real drivers are now policy design, institutional capacity and the credibility of social contracts around projects.
For project developers, the era of substance raises the bar. It is no longer sufficient to align with high level ESG taxonomies or to present generic transition narratives. The differentiators will be credible answers to operational questions: permitting timelines under stringent standards; concrete benefit sharing with states and communities; adoption of technologies that meaningfully reduce footprint and risk; and governance structures that can withstand political and social scrutiny over a full project life.
For companies and countries alike, Davos 2026 introduces a strategic filter: every decision about where, how and with whom minerals are extracted and processed is also a decision about a development model and a geopolitical position. Capital allocation, partnerships and offtake strategies now need to be assessed not only on cost and grade, but on whether they fit models that can sustain legitimacy and speed in this new era of substance. In the Weekly and in our Davos article, we treat this as the core question boards should carry into their own internal discussions in 2026.
Signal 2: NOAA fast tracks deep sea mining permits for U.S. companies
What happened
On 21 January 2026, the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) published a final rule revising its regulations for deep seabed mining exploration licenses and commercial recovery permits under the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act. The rule, effective immediately, consolidates license and permit procedures and is part of a broader Trump administration effort to accelerate U.S. deep sea mining, following an executive order to unleash offshore critical minerals and counter China’s control of key metals. Reuters reports that the new framework aims to streamline and shorten reviews for companies seeking to harvest polymetallic nodules rich in nickel, copper and cobalt in areas beyond national jurisdiction.
Why it matters
This rule moves deep-sea mining from a theoretical future to an actionable path for U.S. companies. It does not, by itself, grant any licenses, but it clears a regulatory backlog and signals political willingness to see U.S. operators move faster than global negotiations at the International Seabed Authority (ISA), where standards remain unsettled.
Strategically, the rule interacts with two dynamics. First, it gives companies like The Metals Company a clearer domestic regulatory channel for pursuing exploration and eventual commercial recovery, potentially accelerating investment decisions. Second, it intensifies a governance gap: U.S. domestic rules and ISA processes may evolve on different timelines and with different thresholds for acceptable environmental impact.
From a legitimacy standpoint, deep sea mining is already contentious. Environmental groups and several governments have called for moratoria, citing risks of irreversible damage to deep ocean ecosystems. The NOAA rule explicitly acknowledges decades old regulations that needed updating, but public acceptance will depend on whether environmental baselines, monitoring and liability are seen as credible. The risk for investors is that projects advance regulatory milestones while facing sustained social, legal and reputational headwinds.
Implications for capital and strategy
For investors and boards, deep sea exposure is now a real, not hypothetical, portfolio question. Any engagement needs to distinguish clearly between near term exploration licenses under the updated U.S. regime and longer term, still uncertain conditions for commercial extraction and product acceptance by downstream OEMs.
For companies considering seabed projects, the NOAA rule makes the U.S. framework procedurally clearer but does not remove the global legitimacy challenge. Capital allocation should assume that permitting and public contestation will move in parallel, with genuine risk of delays, litigation or shifts in consumer and OEM attitudes.
For land based miners, the strategic point is not to ignore deep sea, but to watch how OEMs and governments treat it in their procurement, ESG and security strategies. If deep sea supply is politically constrained or socially resisted, land based nickel, copper and cobalt with strong environmental and community credentials could gain relative bargaining power.
Signal 3: Bolivia reassures investors and prepares new hydrocarbons and lithium laws
What happened
Bolivia’s energy minister, Mauricio Medinaceli, told Reuters that the country will respect all existing hydrocarbons and lithium agreements, including controversial contracts signed with Russian and Chinese companies under the previous government. He described this as a “first message to investors” from President Rodrigo Paz’s centrist administration. The government is drafting a new hydrocarbons law and a separate lithium law aimed at attracting foreign capital through more flexible tax and royalty regimes and new contract models. State company YPFB will remain in the system but lose its dominant role. The reforms are expected to be presented in the first half of 2026, with new exploration bidding rounds envisaged for 2027 if Congress approves the changes.
Why it matters
Bolivia sits on some of the world’s largest lithium resources, but has long struggled to convert them into stable production and investment. The combination of nationalization, strong state control and political volatility has left investors wary. This week’s message is therefore significant: the new government is choosing continuity of contracts plus legal reform, rather than revisiting deals by decree.
For lithium and gas, contract sanctity is central. Publicly committing to honor agreements with Russian and Chinese firms (even when their award has been criticised domestically) is a signal that Bolivia wants to reposition itself as a rules based counterpart. At the same time, the announcement of new laws acknowledges that the current model has under delivered.
The path ahead is narrow. If the reforms are seen as credible, Bolivia could move from being a missed opportunity case into a gradual normalisation, where investors price political risk but see a path to returns. If reforms stall in Congress, or if social unrest around subsidy cuts and economic adjustment escalates, the pledge to respect contracts may not be enough to unlock new capital.
Implications for capital and strategy
For investors and boards, Bolivia should now be treated less as an automatic exclusion and more as a jurisdiction where close tracking of legislative detail and social stability will matter. The signal on contracts reduces immediate expropriation risk, but does not remove execution risk around project timelines and community dynamics.
For existing counterparties (especially Russian and Chinese firms in lithium) the announcement is a confirmation that their position will be re-evaluated within existing contracts, not rewritten from scratch. For potential new entrants, the opportunity lies in partnering into a system that may open to more diverse capital and technology, without assuming a blank slate.
For regional strategy, Bolivia’s move also affects the competitive balance within the lithium triangle. Chile and Argentina are adjusting their own models; Bolivia is now signalling that it wishes to re-enter that conversation as a more predictable, if still complex, partner.
Signal 4: Mali centralises mining control under the presidency
What happened
Mali’s interim president Assimi Goïta has created a new ministerial level position reporting directly to the presidency to oversee the mining sector, and appointed Hilaire Bebian Diarra, a former Barrick executive and geoscientist, to the role. Legal documents indicate that this minister will supervise implementation of mining policy, monitor compliance with the mining code and review reports from title holders, responsibilities previously under the mines ministry. The change follows a 2023 mining code that helped the state recover around $1.2 billion in arrears but contributed to a 23% drop in industrial gold output in 2025, unsettling foreign miners.
Why it matters
Mali is one of Africa’s largest gold producers, and gold is central to its fiscal and external position. The new structure effectively brings operational oversight of mining into the presidency, with the finance ministry handling fiscal matters and the mining ministry focusing on regulation. It is both a response to calls for stronger oversight and a consolidation of political control over the sector.
For investors, two signals matter. First, the state is not retreating from its tougher 2023 code; it is doubling down by centralising enforcement and negotiations. Second, the appointment of a former Barrick executive who previously advised the presidency during a high profile dispute suggests that the government wants technical capacity inside the palace, not only in ministries or companies.
This combination can cut both ways. A more capable, centralised counterpart may be able to resolve disputes and unblock decisions faster, or may decide more aggressively in favour of state interests. Community and security issues, already acute in parts of Mali, will sit in this new configuration, with implications for both social licence and operational continuity.
Implications for capital and strategy
For investors and boards, Mali’s risk profile remains high, but the centre of gravity has shifted. Any new capital decisions should assume that key permit and dispute outcomes will be driven directly from the presidency, and that the 2023 code is the baseline, not a temporary shock.
For companies already present, engagement strategies need to adjust to a more presidentially driven system, where technical arguments about geology, project phasing and community programmes will be heard, but ultimately filtered through broader political and fiscal priorities.
For regional portfolios, Mali’s move is another data point in a broader trend: several African producers are seeking to increase state take and control in mining. The question is which jurisdictions can pair that shift with stable rules and institutional capacity, and which drift toward ad hoc decision making.
Signal 5: Canada’s Infrastructure Bank moves into critical minerals and shared infrastructure
What happened
Mining.com reports that the Canada Infrastructure Bank (CIB), a federal government lender with about C$18 billion in commitments, is pivoting from a focus on base metals and gold toward critical minerals. The bank has already approved a C$55 million bridge loan for Torngat Metals’ Strange Lake rare earths project in Nunavik, Quebec, and is considering a second loan of up to C$500 million to help build access infrastructure for the remote C$2 billion development.
CIB executives state that the bank wants to support feasibility stage projects across Canada’s 34 listed critical minerals. The institution has published a report identifying key barriers to financing these projects: shallow debt and equity markets, limited familiarity with critical minerals among financiers, lack of transparent long term pricing, limited infrastructure in remote regions, and perceived high risk of regulatory delays. As potential solutions, the bank points to co investment in enabling infrastructure (roads, ports, power), revenue risk tools such as contracts for difference, and stronger use of offtake agreements. It already has memorandums of understanding with governments in Manitoba, British Columbia’s Golden Triangle and Saguenay (Quebec) to assess infrastructure options for opening up mining regions.
Why it matters
CIB’s shift is another step in Canada’s evolution from a neutral mining jurisdiction to an active architect of its own critical minerals system. Rather than only funding classic infrastructure (transit, broadband, power), the bank is now explicitly targeting the choke points that keep critical mineral projects from reaching construction: the cost of access to remote deposits, the volatility and opacity of future prices, and the fragmented interface between miners, governments, Indigenous communities and private financiers.
The Torngat/Strange Lake case is emblematic. Rare earth deposits in Canada’s north have long struggled with high capex and logistics costs. A bridge loan, followed by major infrastructure financing, does not guarantee that Strange Lake will reach production, but it changes the geometry of the problem: the state is willing to bear part of the upfront infrastructure and ramp up risk for a deposit considered strategically valuable, provided private capital and offtake are also in place.
At the same time, CIB’s own report is clear that there will be a learning curve. Contracts for difference, shared corridors and regional infrastructure deals are tools that need careful design to avoid locking in uncompetitive projects or creating perceptions of preferential treatment. How the bank balances commercial discipline with strategic objectives will shape not just individual projects, but the credibility of Canada’s broader promise to be a supplier of choice for allies.
Implications for capital and strategy
For investors and boards, the key signal is that Canada is building a dedicated financing spine for critical minerals, with a federal bank ready to take on infrastructure and revenue risk that private markets alone have struggled to underwrite. That can improve bankability for remote or complex projects, but it also means that capital structures, timelines and exit options will increasingly be influenced by public policy objectives.
For project developers, CIB’s dual strategy (direct support to mine projects and co-investment in shared infrastructure) creates a new set of incentives. Being able to anchor a corridor (road, port, power line) or plug into a regional hub like Saguenay may become as important as ore grade in determining which projects advance. At the same time, proponents should expect strong scrutiny on financial metrics, Indigenous partnership, environmental performance and long term competitiveness before public capital is committed.
For portfolio strategy, Canada’s critical mineral story is now less about individual subsidies and more about system design: public banks, regional infrastructure, risk-sharing instruments and regulatory coordination. Exposure to Canadian projects will need to be assessed not only on geology and permitting, but on how effectively each asset can navigate (and benefit from) this emerging institutional architecture.
Signals to watch
- How Davos 2026 themes (the era of substance, material constraints and institutional speed) are reflected in upcoming policy decisions on critical minerals in the U.S., EU, Canada and key producer countries during 2026.
- The first exploration and (eventual) commercial applications processed under NOAA’s revised deep sea mining rule, and how environmental baselines, monitoring and public scrutiny are handled case by case.
- The content, timing and political reception of Bolivia’s new hydrocarbons and lithium laws, including proposed fiscal terms and the redefined role of YPFB.
- How Mali’s new presidential mining minister applies the 2023 mining code in practice (permit renewals, disputes, audits) and whether industrial gold output stabilises or continues to decline.
- Which critical mineral and infrastructure projects the Canada Infrastructure Bank actually finances next, and whether its tools (co-investment in corridors, contracts for difference, revenue risk sharing) become templates for other allied jurisdictions.
Three strategic questions for this week
- Are we adjusting our portfolios and project screens to the era of substance, where permitting timelines, benefit sharing, institutional capacity and social licence are treated as core variables, not as qualitative background?
- How are we treating frontier domains such as deep sea mining in our long-term supply scenarios, and what does our stance imply for capital allocation between seabed options and land based nickel, copper and cobalt projects with strong governance and community credentials?
- In countries where the state is redefining its role (from Bolivia’s legal reforms and Mali’s centralisation to Canada’s use of a public infrastructure bank) do we have a clear view of which models create investable predictability, and which increase our exposure to discretionary, politically driven decisions?
Sources for this week’s note
- Geopolitical Mining, “Davos 2026: Coordinates of the New Geopolitical Era,” January 2026. https://geopoliticalmining.com/davos-2026-coordinates-of-the-new-geopolitical-era/
- World Economic Forum, Davos 2026 https://www.weforum.org
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NOAA / Federal Register, “Deep Seabed Mining: Revisions to Regulations for Exploration License and Commercial Recovery Permit Applications,” final rule, 21 January 2026; and NOAA, “NOAA accelerates permitting timeline for deep seabed mining applications,” 21 January 2026.
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/01/21/2026-01044/deep-seabed-mining-revisions-to-regulations-for-exploration-license-and-commercial-recovery-permit ; https://www.noaa.gov/news-release/noaa-accelerates-permitting-timeline-for-deep-seabed-mining-applications - Reuters, “Bolivia pledges to honor energy, lithium deals to reassure investors,” 19 January 2026. https://www.reuters.com/sustainability/boards-policy-regulation/bolivia-pledges-honor-energy-lithium-deals-reassure-investors-2026-01-19/
- Reuters, “Mali’s president tightens direct control over key mining sector,” 22 January 2026. https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/malis-president-tightens-direct-control-over-key-mining-sector-2026-01-22/
- Mining.com, “Canadian government bank has billions to back critical mineral projects,” 20 January 2026. https://www.mining.com/canadian-government-bank-has-billions-to-back-critical-mineral-projects/
For the full Geopolitical Mining framework behind this Weekly, see our book Mining Is Dead. Long Live Geopolitical Mining .