Geopolitical Mining Weekly
Week of 26 January – 1 February 2026
Authors: Marta Rivera | Eduardo Zamanillo
Independent weekly note for investors and strategic decision makers in critical minerals and mining.
What this week really tells us
This week, five moves stood out in the critical minerals and mining space:
- In British Columbia, a First Nations chief used the AME Roundup conference to call for shared decision making and respect for Indigenous law in mining, against the backdrop of a landmark court ruling on UNDRIP.
- In eastern DRC, more than 200 people were killed in a coltan mine collapse at Rubaya, a site that produces around 15% of the world’s coltan, reviving questions about conflict minerals and supply chain responsibility.
- India detailed plans to subsidise lithium and nickel processing, signalling a push to build midstream capacity rather than rely on Chinese processors.
- Brazil was again in the spotlight as the US and EU courted its critical minerals, while a bill to create a national policy for critical minerals advanced domestically.
- Metals markets saw a Friday massacre in gold and silver prices, even as BMI reiterated a cautiously optimistic 2026 outlook supported by the global scramble for critical minerals.
Taken together, these moves sharpen the picture of the era of substance we have been describing. On one side, governments and markets are trying to build new architectures around critical minerals: India on processing, Brazil as a green supplier, investors mapping a multi-year price environment. On the other, the BC and DRC stories remind us that the constraints are institutional and human: Indigenous law, court rulings, conflict, informality and safety standards all shape what supply is actually legitimate and sustainable.
The pattern is clear. The system is being redesigned at three levels at once:
- governance and consent in safe jurisdictions (BC and Canada),
- safety, control and conflict in frontier and fragile jurisdictions (DRC),
- and industrial policy, incentives and national strategies in the big demographic and resource powers (India, Brazil).
For boards and investors, the key message is that geological potential and headline prices are necessary but no longer sufficient. Capital now has to navigate a map defined by Indigenous authority, conflict dynamics, industrial policy and price volatility, and still deliver projects that can survive both political cycles and market shocks.
Signals of the week
Signal 1: BC’s Roundup puts shared decision making at the centre of critical minerals
What happened
At the AME Roundup conference in Vancouver, Chief Rosanne Casimir of the Tk̓emlúps te Secwépemc Nation delivered a keynote calling for shared decision making, respect for Indigenous law and early engagement as the basis for meaningful reconciliation in British Columbia’s mining sector.
She spoke in the context of:
- the provincial Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Act (DRIPA),
- a December 2025 ruling by the BC Court of Appeal that DRIPA incorporates UNDRIP and creates legally enforceable obligations,
- and intense mineral tenure pressure in Stk̓emlúpsemc te Secwépemc Nation (SSN) territory, where many mineral claims have been staked without First Nations’ consent.
Casimir stressed that SSN is not anti mining, but opposes projects in culturally and environmentally sensitive areas, and emphasised the Nation’s own environmental assessment processes grounded in Secwépemc law and stewardship responsibilities.
Why it matters
BC is not a peripheral jurisdiction; it is central to copper and critical mineral supply narratives in North America. What is emerging is a shift from consult and adjust toward co-governance and shared decision making, now underpinned by UNDRIP linked legal obligations rather than soft commitments.
For companies, the message is explicit: automatic online staking, late stage consultation and transactional approaches are inconsistent with the direction of BC law and Indigenous expectations. For governments, framing mining inside critical minerals and national security narratives does not override Indigenous authority; in fact, it amplifies the stakes.
Implications for capital and strategy
For investors and boards, BC should now be modelled as a jurisdiction where Indigenous law and shared decision making are structural variables, not project by project risks. Timelines, approvals and even project design will be shaped by whether proponents engage early and build genuine governance partnerships with First Nations.
For project developers, the differentiator will be who can move beyond consultation to co-designed assessment and monitoring frameworks, with clear roles, benefits and veto points. Projects that treat this as a compliance afterthought will face rising legal and reputational risk, regardless of how strategic their commodity mix is on slide decks.
Signal 2: Coltan mine collapse in DRC exposes the human cost of conflict minerals
What happened
More than 200 people were killed this week in a collapse at the Rubaya coltan mine in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, according to provincial officials quoted by Reuters. The site, near Rubaya, produces around 15% of the world’s coltan, which is processed into tantalum for mobile phones, computers, aerospace components and gas turbines.
The mine is under the control of the AFC/M23 rebel group, and locals dig manually for a few dollars a day. The UN has accused the group of plundering Rubaya’s resources to fund its insurgency.
Why it matters
Rubaya is a stark reminder that a non trivial share of the global supply of an essential specialty metal still comes from informal, high risk and conflict linked operations. The collapse highlights three layers of risk:
- Human and social risk: unsafe artisanal conditions and mass casualties.
- Governance and security risk: armed group control, extortion and illicit trade.
- Supply chain risk: OEMs and downstream manufacturers remain exposed to sources that are difficult to reconcile with ESG commitments and regulatory regimes on conflict minerals.
For African governments and communities, the tragedy also underlines the gap between rhetoric on value addition and the reality that, in many areas, basic safety and rule of law remain unresolved.
Implications for capital and strategy
For investors and boards, tantalum exposure should no longer be treated as a small technical detail in a broader materials list. Portfolio and supply chain risk assessments need granular visibility on where coltan/tantalum is sourced, how it is tracked, and what portion of revenue could be indirectly linked to informal or conflict production.
For OEMs and refiners, Rubaya will intensify pressure to accelerate formalisation and diversification: supporting more mechanised, regulated operations in the region, or shifting marginal demand to alternative sources where safety, labour and governance standards are demonstrably stronger.
For policymakers and multilaterals, the case underscores that efforts to build formal critical mineral corridors in Africa must go hand in hand with security, institutional support and community centred development, or the informal and armed group economy will continue to undercut both legitimacy and stability.
Signal 3: India moves from critical mineral importer to aspiring processor
What happened
According to a government presentation reported by Reuters and carried by MINING.COM, India plans to offer 15% capital subsidies for companies that set up lithium and nickel processing plants, as part of a new critical minerals policy.
The scheme would:
- apply to projects starting on or after 1 April 2026,
- run for five years,
- be capped at 40% of annual net sales turnover for lithium plants and 25% for nickel,
- require minimum capacities of 30,000 t/y for lithium and 50,000 t/y for nickel,
- and initially target two lithium and two nickel plants to meet domestic demand by 2030.
This move sits alongside India’s earlier designation of key minerals as critical and its EV targets of 30% penetration for cars and 80% for two wheelers by 2030.
Why it matters
India is signalling that it does not intend to be only a demand centre and importer of processed material. By subsidising processing, New Delhi is trying to reduce dependence on China for battery grade lithium and nickel, develop domestic technological and industrial capacity, and position itself as a midstream node in regional supply chains.
The design of the scheme is telling: it emphasises scale, utilisation and time limited support. That suggests India wants projects that can be competitive beyond subsidy, not permanent loss makers.
Implications for capital and strategy
For investors and boards, India’s incentives should trigger a reassessment of where midstream capacity for EV materials can realistically grow. Processing economics, policy support and access to the Indian market may make some projects viable that would not be attractive elsewhere, but execution risks (land, permitting, infrastructure) remain significant.
For miners and upstream developers, the key question is how to plug into this emerging processing base: via joint ventures with Indian partners, long term offtake linked to local plants, or integrated models that combine foreign feedstock with Indian processing and manufacturing.
For OEMs, India’s move is another reason to treat the country as more than a sales market. The combination of industrial policy, demand growth and geographic positioning could make India an important part of diversified, non Chinese EV material chains, for those prepared to make early, disciplined investments.
Signal 4: Brazil’s critical minerals courted abroad, structuring policy at home
What happened
Reporting by EL PAÍS and legal analyses highlight how Brazil is being pulled into the centre of global critical minerals diplomacy while it advances its own domestic framework.
On the external front, the US and EU are actively courting Brazil:
- US and Brazilian teams have held preliminary talks that include rare earths alongside broader discussions on tariffs. The US State Department has publicly announced a Critical Minerals Ministerial in Washington on 4 February, with Brazil and Argentina among expected participants.
- EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen signalled Brussels’ interest in Brazilian lithium, nickel and rare earths during a visit to Rio de Janeiro linked to the EU-Mercosur agreement, mentioning cooperation on joint investment projects.
Domestically:
A bill establishing a national policy for critical minerals (PL 3,699/2025) is pending before Congress and expected to be approved in 2026. Legal commentary notes that the bill would formalise state level commitment to critical minerals, aiming to enhance regulatory stability and legal certainty for long term investment in minerals such as lithium, niobium, rare earths, copper, manganese, cobalt and graphite.
Why it matters
Brazil is not only a large iron ore and bauxite producer; it is also emerging in lithium, rare earths and other transition metals. What is changing now is its bargaining position: multiple major powers are signalling they need Brazilian supply to diversify away from China, while Brazil is working to codify its own priorities and conditions through a critical minerals policy.
The combination of external courtship and internal policy design gives Brazil leverage, but also raises the stakes. Regulatory uncertainty, financing gaps, environmental risks and the legacy of tailings dam disasters remain live issues. How Brazil chooses to structure royalties, local content, environmental safeguards and Indigenous participation will determine whether it is seen as a green critical minerals leader or as a high risk jurisdiction with under realised potential.
Implications for capital and strategy
For investors and boards, Brazil should now be read as a strategic but conditional destination for capital. The opportunity lies in aligning with a national policy framework that could provide clearer rules for critical minerals, while remaining realistic about permitting, enforcement and social expectations.
For project developers, early alignment with Brazil’s evolving policy, and with the interests of both Brasília and subnational authorities, will matter. Projects that can demonstrate strong governance, environmental performance and local benefit sharing are more likely to attract support from both Brazilian institutions and foreign partners (US, EU, others) seeking reliable supply.
For policymakers and downstream companies, Brazil is a test case for whether Global South producers can capture more value (through processing and higher standards) while still providing the volumes and reliability that diversified supply chains require.
Signal 5: A violent price correction tests a cautiously optimistic 2026 outlook
What happened
On Friday 30 January, precious metals and copper prices saw a dramatic sell off:
- Gold futures fell as much as 11.4% in one day, the biggest intra-day decline since the early 1980s, closing around $4,745/oz.
- Silver dropped nearly 36%, the largest recorded single-day fall, while palladium and platinum fell around 15 – 17%.
- Copper futures fell up to 9.5% intraday, to about $12,700/t, before recovering part of the losses and closing roughly 4.5% down, still up around 4% year to date after hitting an all time high the day before.
- Mining stocks globally suffered double-digit percentage losses, particularly gold and silver producers, with billions wiped off market capitalisation in a single session.
This correction came only weeks after BMI, part of Fitch Solutions, published its metals and mining outlook for 2026, describing a cautiously optimistic price environment in which most minerals and metals would edge higher versus 2025, driven by decarbonisation demand, tighter supply and an intensifying global race for critical minerals, but with downside risks from China’s property sector and global growth.
Why it matters
The episode illustrates the gap between structural narratives and market mechanics:
- structurally, analysts expect tight supply, robust energy transition demand and active industrial policy to support prices;
- tactically, markets remain vulnerable to macro triggers (in this case, Fed leadership signals) and position unwinds after a strong rally.
For boards and investors, the message is not that the structural story has disappeared, but that price paths will likely be non linear, with bouts of extreme volatility layered on top of multi year trends.
Implications for capital and strategy
For investors and boards, this week’s price action reinforces the need for conservative price decks and robust downside testing in project evaluation. Relying on peak or near peak prices to justify capital allocation is risky in an environment where double digit daily moves are possible even for large, liquid metals.
For project developers, the signal is that funding and offtake partners will increasingly distinguish between projects that are viable under moderate price assumptions, and those that only work if current highs persist. The ability to demonstrate cost discipline, optionality and resilience to price shocks becomes as important as headline NPV.
For companies and policymakers, the BMI outlook and the correction together suggest that 2026 will be defined less by runaway price gains and more by strategic positioning: who can secure supply, manage volatility and align with industrial policy without over extending balance sheets.
Signals to watch
- How British Columbia implements the Court of Appeal’s DRIPA/UNDRIP ruling in upcoming policy changes and specific permitting decisions, and whether “shared decision making” evolves into formal co-management structures.
- The international and regulatory response to the Rubaya collapse in DRC: investigations, potential enforcement of due diligence regimes, and pressure on downstream users of tantalum to demonstrate clean supply chains.
- The final design and approval of India’s lithium and nickel processing incentive scheme, including which companies and locations apply for the first two lithium and two nickel plants.
- Progress of Brazil’s critical minerals bill through Congress and the concrete outcomes of February’s Critical Minerals Ministerial in Washington for Brazilian projects and partnerships.
- How miners, investors and lenders adjust their price assumptions and hedging strategies after the January 30 sell-off, and whether this affects the pace of project approvals and M&A in 2026.
Three strategic questions for this week
- Are we updating our social licence and governance frameworks for safe jurisdictions like British Columbia, where Indigenous law and shared decision making are becoming hard constraints, not soft factors?
- Do we have a precise view of our exposure (direct or indirect) to high risk, informal or conflict linked supply (such as DRC coltan), and a credible plan to shift towards sources that match our stated ESG and regulatory commitments?
- In building our capital allocation and risk models, are we combining structural scenarios (BMI type outlooks) with realistic assumptions about sharp price corrections and policy shocks, and deciding which projects still make sense under those combined conditions?
Sources for this week’s note
- MINING.COM, “AME: First Nations Chief calls for shared decision-making in British Columbia mining,” 30 January 2026.
- MINING.COM / Reuters, “More than 200 killed in coltan mine collapse in east Congo, official says,” 30 January 2026.
- MINING.COM / Reuters, “India to unveil incentives for lithium, nickel processing,” 29 January 2026.
- EL PAÍS English, “The US and Europe are courting Brazil for its critical minerals and rare earth elements,” 23 January 2026; Chambers Global Practice Guides, “Mining 2026 – Brazil: Trends and Developments,” January 2026.
- MINING.COM, “Most mineral and metal prices to edge higher in 2026, BMI forecasts,” 5 January 2026; “Global scramble for critical minerals to shape markets in 2026: BMI,” 8 December 2025; and “CHART: Friday massacre for mining stocks but copper price pulls out of nosedive,” 30 January 2026.
For the full Geopolitical Mining framework behind this Weekly, see our book Mining Is Dead. Long Live Geopolitical Mining .