Geopolitical Mining Weekly
Week of 29 December 2025 – 4 January 2026
Authors: Marta Rivera | Eduardo Zamanillo
Independent weekly note for investors and strategic decision makers in critical minerals and mining.
What this week really tells us
This week, five moves stood out in the critical minerals and energy space:
- In Guinea, a major bauxite operator launched a US$28.9 billion arbitration claim after its licence was revoked in a broader permit clean up.
- In Zambia, the authorities confirmed that certain mining taxes and royalties can now be settled in Chinese yuan, aligning fiscal flows more closely with copper exports and Chinese debt exposure.
- In the DRC, the Kamoa–Kakula copper smelter produced its first anodes, starting the ramp-up of what is expected to become Africa’s largest copper smelter.
- In Chile, a strike at Capstone Copper’s Mantoverde mine cut operations to roughly 30% of capacity amid failed wage negotiations.
- In Venezuela, the capture of Nicolás Maduro by US forces opened a new phase of political and security uncertainty around a country that combines oil wealth with an increasingly important illegal mining frontier.
Taken together, these signals point to the same underlying pattern:
Critical minerals and energy assets are increasingly shaped by licence security, currency choices, midstream location, labour dynamics and security doctrine, not just by geology and headline prices.
For investors and boards, the core questions are shifting toward:
• how resilient legal and fiscal frameworks are when states recalibrate their resource strategies,
• how midstream and labour decisions affect supply reliability, and
• how national security framing in the Americas may influence risk in resource rich jurisdictions.
Signals of the week
Signal 1 – Guinea: a US$28.9bn arbitration tests licence security
What happened
A UAE-based mining company has filed an arbitration claim of at least US$28.9 billion against the Republic of Guinea at the World Bank’s ICSID. The case centres on the cancellation of the company’s bauxite mining licence as part of a broader revocation of more than 50 permits. The operator argues that its mine was the country’s second largest bauxite exporter, with substantial reserves and investment, and alleges unlawful expropriation and seizure of assets. The Guinean government has presented the cancellations as enforcement of the mining code and part of an effort to ensure licences are effectively used and aligned with national objectives.
Why it matters
This dispute encapsulates the shift from a purely legalistic view of mining rights to a more explicitly political and strategic one:
- Guinea is asserting that licences are conditional on performance and value creation, not permanent entitlements.
- Investors are testing, through arbitration, where the boundary lies between legitimate policy enforcement and measures that materially undermine property rights.
- The process will be watched as a practical test case of the tensions described in “The mining we knew is dead. Long live geopolitical mining” – licence decisions as instruments of bargaining power in a more contested global mining order.
Implications for capital and strategy
- For investors/boards, this implies that licence and arbitration risk needs to be treated as a core component of country risk in Guinea and similar jurisdictions, not as a tail event.
- Due diligence should examine recent enforcement practice and dispute patterns, not only the written law.
- Financing and contract structures may need stronger political-risk provisions and clearer remedies in the event of permit revocation or mass reviews.
Signal 2 – Zambia opens mining tax payments to the yuan
What happened
Zambia’s central bank has confirmed an RMB settlement option within the mining tax remittance mechanism. Chinese owned mines have begun using yuan to settle part of their fiscal obligations, matching the currency increasingly used for their copper exports to China and for servicing some of Zambia’s external debt. Authorities present the move as part of a strategy to diversify reserves and reduce foreign exchange risk in a context where China is both a key buyer of copper and a major creditor.
Why it matters
This decision adjusts the financial plumbing around a major copper producer:
- It links the currency of trade, the currency of taxation and the currency of debt service in a more coherent renminbi based loop.
- It may lower transaction costs and FX volatility for both operators and the state.
- It raises questions about how other mining jurisdictions with high Chinese exposure might adapt their fiscal, reserve and payment arrangements.
The issue for markets is not whether yuan is better than dollars, but how changes to the currency architecture affect fiscal stability, cash repatriation, and the balance of influence between creditors, buyers and host states.
Implications for capital and strategy
- For investors/boards, this implies that currency and payment mechanics are becoming part of the strategic risk map in some mining jurisdictions, especially where Chinese trade and lending are central.
- Treasury and tax planning for operations in Zambia will need to incorporate multi currency scenarios and potential shifts in how the state manages its reserves and obligations.
- Over time, similar moves elsewhere could deepen renminbi based circuits around some critical-mineral flows, with implications for how Western institutions engage.
Signal 3 – Kamoa–Kakula smelter: Africa’s largest copper smelter comes online
What happened
Ivanhoe Mines has announced first copper anode production from the new smelter at the Kamoa–Kakula complex in the DRC. The direct to blister smelter has a design capacity of 500,000 tonnes of copper per year at steady state, which would make it the largest copper smelter in Africa once fully ramped up. The smelter is currently processing stockpiled concentrate, with ramp up expected through 2026. Kamoa–Kakula is jointly owned by Ivanhoe, Zijin Mining and the DRC government.
Why it matters
The Kamoa–Kakula smelter signals a further shift of copper value-add into producer countries:
- It reduces dependence on overseas smelters and long export routes, and may change regional trade patterns as more DRC copper ships as anode, not concentrate.
- It concentrates more industrial, power and ESG risk in a single, high profile midstream asset in a complex jurisdiction.
- It raises strategic questions about where new smelting capacity will be located in a world where some traditional smelting hubs face power constraints and tighter regulations.
- It also illustrates the dynamics explored in “Copper premiums and geopolitical mining” – midstream location and ownership can influence treatment charges, premia and which buyers have preferential access to specific streams of refined copper.
Implications for capital and strategy
- For investors/boards, this implies that midstream location is a strategic choice, not a neutral optimisation: more smelting in producer countries changes the risk profile and may shift premia and trade routes.
- Offtakers buying anodes from Kamoa–Kakula need to weigh lower logistics and treatment costs against higher jurisdictional and infrastructure risks in the DRC.
- Other producer countries and companies will be assessing whether to replicate this model, partner on smelting elsewhere, or continue relying on existing hubs.
Signal 4 – Mantoverde strike: labour risk in Chile’s copper belt
What happened
Workers at Capstone Copper’s Mantoverde mine in northern Chile have gone on strike after collective bargaining talks failed to produce a new agreement. The union has indicated it is prepared for a prolonged stoppage. The company has said that operations will continue at a reduced rate, around 30% of normal capacity. The strike takes place against a backdrop of high copper prices and ongoing debates about taxation, investment and social expectations in Chile’s mining sector.
Why it matters
The Mantoverde strike is a reminder that labour remains a central variable in copper supply in Chile and other strongly unionised jurisdictions. Even if this particular dispute is resolved relatively quickly, it highlights broader questions:
- How will wage and benefit expectations evolve if high copper prices persist?
- How resilient are individual operations, and supply chains, to multi week stoppages at key assets?
- How will the state balance support for labour rights with concerns about investment, fiscal revenues and the country’s reputation as a reliable supplier?
Labour risk, in this context, is not a separate theme from ESG or jurisdictional risk; it is one of the mechanisms through which social and political pressures materialise at the asset level.
Implications for capital and strategy
- For investors/boards, this implies that labour and social risk need to be explicitly integrated into supply models and scenario analysis for Chile and similar jurisdictions, rather than treated as residual.
- Companies may need more robust labour strategies and contingency plans for operations and customer commitments in a high price, high expectation environment.
- Downstream users with significant exposure to Chilean copper have an incentive to examine diversification options or contractual flexibilities to absorb mine level shocks.
Signal 5 – Maduro’s capture: national security, oil and a fragile mining frontier
What happened
In early January 2026, US forces captured Venezuelan president Nicolás Maduro and his wife in a military operation in Caracas and transferred them to New York, where he is expected to face narco terrorism and drug trafficking charges based on pre existing US indictments. Washington has framed the move as part of a broader national security and anti cartel strategy. Venezuela’s vice president has claimed interim leadership and denounced the action as a violation of sovereignty. International reactions are divided, and debates have begun around the legal basis and long-term consequences of the operation.
Why it matters
Three elements are particularly relevant for energy and mining.
1. Energy and economic weight
Venezuela still holds some of the world’s largest oil reserves and remains relevant for heavy and sour crude at a time when global markets are being reconfigured around sanctions, OPEC+ policy and energy transition uncertainty. Any scenario in which external actors seek to manage or influence Venezuela’s transition will necessarily involve decisions about who controls PDVSA, how oil projects are restructured and how revenues are allocated.
2. Illegal and informal mining in the Orinoco region
Beyond oil, Venezuela has become a hotspot for illegal gold, coltan and other extraction in the Orinoco Mining Arc and surrounding Amazon areas, with organised crime and armed groups involved in production and trade. That reality is documented by UNODC and multiple independent studies. Maduro’s capture raises questions such as:
- Does a change in the balance of power lead to stronger institutions and more effective control of illegal mining, or to a more fragmented landscape where local armed groups gain more influence?
- How will external actors, including the US and regional governments, integrate the Amazon and Orinoco mining frontier into any broader stabilisation or transition agenda?
3. National Security Strategy and resource governance
As discussed in “America’s 2025 National Security Strategy: when economic power and critical minerals move to the center” , US security thinking now places economic and resource resilience at the core. The operation in Venezuela can be read in that context: not only as enforcement of long standing indictments, but as part of a wider effort to reshape the political and economic architecture of a resource rich country in the US near periphery.
The key issues now are less about the event itself and more about what follows: who will govern, under what institutional arrangements, and with what approach to oil and to mining frontiers that currently mix state operated, opaque and informal structures. We explore these scenarios in more depth in “Venezuela after Maduro: oil, illegal mining and US national security”.
Implications for capital and strategy
- Venezuela moves further into a high uncertainty, high optionality category: there is potential upside in any credible stabilisation that rebuilds institutions, and significant risk around sanctions, contract continuity and security in the short to medium term.
- For companies and policymakers in the Americas, this underscores that US security framing now clearly extends to energy and, increasingly, critical minerals; changes in that framing can alter risk profiles across the region.
- In the Amazon and Orinoco mining frontier, the strategic question is whether this shock leads to stronger governance and enforcement against illegal mining, or to a more fragmented scenario where multiple actors, including criminal networks, compete for control of gold and critical minerals.
Signals to watch
- Evolution of the Guinea arbitration case: whether it is settled, escalates or triggers further claims from other operators affected by permit cancellations.
- Implementation of Zambia’s yuan tax payment mechanism: which taxes are regularly paid in renminbi and how this affects reserve management, debt service and FX dynamics.
- Kamoa–Kakula smelter ramp up: stability of power supply, progress toward nameplate capacity and changes in DRC copper export patterns as more metal ships as anode.
- Duration and resolution of the Mantoverde strike, and whether similar labour disputes emerge at other copper operations in Chile as price and cost pressures interact.
- Political and security developments in Venezuela: signs of institutional strengthening versus fragmentation, and any early indications of how oil and illegal mining frontiers will be handled in practice.
Three strategic questions for this week
Licence and dispute risk
- Are our country and project filters adequately capturing the risk that aggressive policy shifts or enforcement campaigns could lead to large scale licence disputes and arbitration, as seen in Guinea?
Currency and fiscal architecture
- As countries like Zambia begin to accept mining taxes in yuan, how exposed are our portfolios and counterparties to changes in the currency architecture of mining fiscal regimes in systems where Chinese trade and lending are central?
Security and midstream bottlenecks
- With new smelters being built in higher risk jurisdictions, strikes affecting mines in core producers, and national security doctrine reshaping the context in places like Venezuela, how are we integrating midstream location, labour stability and security framing into our view of where future copper and other strategic supply will actually come from?
Sources for this week’s note
- Reuters, “Axis International seeks $28.9 billion from Guinea over revoked bauxite permit,” 29 December 2025.
- Bloomberg News via MINING.COM, “Chinese mining companies in Zambia start paying taxes in yuan,” 2 January 2026.
- Ivanhoe Mines, “First copper anode produced at Kamoa–Kakula copper smelter in the DRC,” 2 January 2026.
- Bloomberg News via MINING.COM, “Miners go on strike at Capstone Copper’s Mantoverde mine in Chile after talks fail,” 2 January 2026.
- Various international and regional outlets on the capture of Nicolás Maduro and subsequent reactions, early January 2026.