Geopolitical Mining · Article

China’s Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean: Systems and Strategic Positioning

Authors: Marta Rivera | Eduardo Zamanillo

Beijing’s new blueprint for Latin America and the Caribbean treats the region as a long term partner in energy, resources and technology, with mining embedded in a wider architecture of finance, infrastructure and governance.

1. Why this document matters

On 10 December 2025, China released its third Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), the first update since 2016. It is a long, detailed document that reads less like a speech and more like a systems blueprint: five overarching programs (Solidarity, Development, Civilization, Peace and People to People Connectivity), dozens of cooperation tracks, and a dense web of references to the Global Development, Security, Civilization and Governance Initiatives, the Belt and Road, and the China CELAC Forum.

For mining and critical minerals, the point is not that Beijing lists copper, lithium or rare earths by name, it mostly does not. The point is how the paper integrates LAC into China’s global strategy, and how energy, resources and infrastructure are positioned inside a wider economic and geopolitical architecture.

The signal is clear: Latin America and the Caribbean are not treated as a marginal supplier or a simple export market. They are framed as a structural partner in China’s vision of a more multipolar, inclusive globalization and a community with a shared future for the Global South.

2. The material layer: energy, resources and industrial chains

The most explicit reference to resources appears in the Development Program, under Energy and Resources Cooperation. China declares that it stands ready to expand and deepen cooperation “across the whole industrial chain” of energy: increasing cooperation in oil and gas, strengthening work on hydropower, solar, wind and hydrogen, deepening peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and enhancing the “green development and utilization of mineral resources at various stages.”

One phrase is particularly revealing. Beijing proposes to work with LAC countries to explore mechanisms for long term supply and local currency pricing and settlement of energy and resource products, with the stated goal of reducing exposure to external economic and financial risks. Even without listing specific ores, this links Latin American minerals directly to China’s search for greater monetary and financial autonomy.

The underlying logic is straightforward:

The region matters as an energy base, both fossil and clean.
It matters as a mineral base for global chains in which Chinese firms already dominate key positions: EVs, batteries, grids, steel, aluminium and other advanced industrial inputs.
And it is seen as a space where long-term contracts, investment frameworks and financial arrangements can be shaped to fit China’s own industrial and monetary architecture.

Other sections reinforce this integration. Infrastructure cooperation covers transport, logistics, power systems, telecoms, digital networks and smart cities. Manufacturing cooperation includes raw materials, equipment, green industries, industrial parks and “closer China LAC industrial and supply chains.” Science and technology chapters propose joint work in information technology, artificial intelligence, new energy, new materials and biomedicine.

Taken together, minerals are not treated as a stand alone topic. They are embedded in an ecosystem of energy, infrastructure, industry and technology in which China is seeking to anchor itself at the centre.

3. The institutional and political layer: architecture for a long game

Beyond sectors, the Policy Paper builds an institutional framework designed for the long term.

First, it relocates LAC within China’s geopolitical map. Latin America and the Caribbean are described as a dynamic part of the Global South, a significant force for world peace, stability and development, and an important actor in the move towards a multipolar world and a more “equitable” global governance system. The text reaffirms the one China principle as the political foundation of relations, thanks LAC countries that support Beijing on Taiwan, and calls for mutual support on sovereignty, security and territorial integrity.

In other words, before touching resources, the paper emphasises a political community of interest: shared opposition to hegemonism and power politics, shared demand for more voice in global institutions, and a narrative of South–South solidarity.

Second, it deepens the financial and trade plumbing of the relationship. China explicitly encourages:

stronger links between Chinese and Latin American financial institutions,
more dialogue between central banks and regulators,
expanded use of local currencies and the renminbi in cross border settlement,
and greater reliance on Chinese backed funds and facilities, from the China–LAC Cooperation Fund and concessional loans to special infrastructure and production capacity funds.

Alongside this, Beijing calls for more investment protection agreements, double taxation treaties and cooperation on tax administration under Belt and Road tax mechanisms. For mining, energy and infrastructure projects, this suggests that a growing share of capital, contractual norms and risk-sharing mechanisms may flow through China–LAC financial circuits that sit partly outside traditional dollar centric channels.

Third, the paper consolidates China–CELAC structures as a core political and operational platform: ministerial meetings, foreign ministers’ dialogues, coordinators’ meetings, and a range of sectoral forums. This means that key decisions or debates on investment, including in mining and energy, can be handled not only bilaterally but also through a collective LAC lens, with CELAC acting as a counterparty to China.

For geopolitical mining, that matters. It implies that the governance context for resources is being layered: national politics, regional organisations and a structured relationship with a major external power.

4. The legitimacy and narrative layer: South–South cooperation, with Chinese characteristics

The Policy Paper is also an exercise in story-telling.

It insists that the China–LAC relationship “does not target or exclude any third party” and is not subordinated to any external actor. Cooperation is presented as based on equality, mutual benefit, openness and inclusiveness, with no political conditions attached. China positions itself as a long term partner ready to invest in infrastructure, trade, finance, agriculture, health, education, digital, AI, space and more, with resources and energy as one piece in a much larger cooperation package.

At the same time, the document sends sharper messages between the lines. It criticises “unilateral bullying practices,” defends the multilateral trading system, calls for reform of international economic governance to increase the representation of emerging markets, and explicitly rejects “decoupling” and “reinventing the wheel” in global value chains.

The narrative is designed to resonate in a region with a long memory of external intervention and conditionality. It contrasts China’s offer of infrastructure + finance + trade + technology with a more fragmented and often more conditional Western presence, especially in the wake of sanctions, trade disputes and a renewed focus on critical minerals from the U.S. and EU.

How this will play domestically in LAC is not predetermined. In many countries, three sensitivities coexist:

A historical suspicion of great-power influence, regardless of whether it comes from Washington, Brussels or Beijing.
A pragmatic recognition that China has become a crucial source of demand, capital and infrastructure.
A growing internal debate on resource governance: how far to go with foreign involvement in lithium, copper, rare earths and other strategic sectors, and under what conditions.

For mining, legitimacy will not be defined only by local ESG performance. It will also depend on how projects are perceived within this larger geopolitical framing: as instruments of national development and diversification, or as components of a new pattern of dependency, this time centred on China.

5. Implications for capital and strategy

Seen through a Geopolitical Mining lens, the Policy Paper has several concrete implications.

First, it consolidates LAC as a structural partner for China in energy, resources and industry. The intention is not just to buy ore or oil, but to integrate parts of the region into industrial and technological chains where Chinese firms already hold strong positions. That suggests continued, and possibly intensified, Chinese interest in:

mining projects linked to batteries, EVs, grids and broader electrification,
refineries, chemical plants and processing hubs near resource bases,
and integrated packages where offtake, equity, finance and construction are negotiated together.

For project sponsors, this means that Chinese capital and companies will likely remain central players in any serious attempt to develop new critical minerals capacity in Latin America.

Second, it obliges Latin American governments to manage a more complex alignment game. China’s offer is comprehensive and backed by a clear narrative. In parallel, the United States, the EU, Japan and others are building their own diversification strategies, often framing Latin America as a necessary partner in reducing dependency on China for critical minerals.

In practice, decisions about lithium concessions, copper projects or associated infrastructure will increasingly shape:

how each country positions itself between overlapping Chinese and Western supply chain strategies,
how much room it preserves to negotiate value added at home,
and how it balances short term capital inflows with long term control over strategic sectors.

Third, it raises the bar for non Chinese capital. The Policy Paper shows that China is willing to combine industrial policy, diplomacy, finance and corporate presence in a coordinated way. Western and regional investors that want to remain relevant in LAC mining and midstream will have to compete not just on return, but on:

governance and transparency,
environmental and social standards that align with local expectations,
technological differentiation,
and access to other markets that could complement, rather than simply replicate, Chinese demand.

Otherwise, they risk being sidelined by offers that arrive with more tools and a more coherent political framing.

6. Open questions for boards and policy-makers

The Policy Paper does not fix the future, it frames it. For investors, boards and governments, it leaves several strategic questions on the table:

How much of the future mining and energy pipeline in Latin America will be structured primarily within a Chinese centred financial and industrial ecosystem, and on what terms?
How will countries use the presence of multiple suitors, China, the U.S., the EU and others, to improve their bargaining position, instead of being pulled into zero sum alignments?
To what extent will processing and manufacturing move into Latin America, rather than remaining concentrated in China, especially for lithium, copper, graphite and rare earths?
How will this architecture interact with the domestic politics of mining legitimacy in the region, where communities are already tense about impacts, inequality and past experiences of extractivism?

What is clear is that, for China, Latin America and the Caribbean are now codified as an enduring pillar of its resource, industrial and geopolitical strategy. For the region, and for the capital that wants to operate there, the challenge is to understand that framework in detail and to position projects and portfolios with eyes wide open to both its opportunities and its constraints.

Source

State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China. (2025, December 10). China’s policy paper on Latin America and the Caribbean [Policy paper]. The State Council of the People’s Republic of China.